In a noteworthy decision for civil litigation in Ohio, the Supreme Court has extended the application of the “same-juror rule,” previously, the rule only applied in the context of cases involving comparative negligence, but now has been expanded to all negligence cases where juries answer sequential interrogatories that separate the elements of negligence to arrive at a general verdict.
Hild v. Samaritan Health Partners (Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-3338) involved an action for medical negligence wherein six of eight jurors found a defendant, Ward, negligent. Following the trial court’s instructions, only those six were instructed to go on to vote on the question of proximate cause, and the jury concluded that Ward did not proximately cause the plaintiff’s decedent’s injury and death. A verdict for Defendants followed, and Hild’s motion for a new trial was denied on appeal the Second District Court of Appeals which found that the trial court erred in applying the same-juror rule to the jury interrogatories. The Second District affirmed the finding of Ward’s negligence but remanded the case for a new trial on the question of whether Ward’s negligence directly and proximately caused plaintiff’s injury, as well as other issues.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Second District and reinstated the defense verdict. After weighing the relative merits of the “same-juror” and “any-juror” rules, the Supreme Court held that it would be illogical to permit jurors who did not find the existence of a duty or a breach of duty to vote on the question of proximate cause. It accordingly held that only those jurors who find negligence may proceed to the next interrogatory in sequence and vote on the issue of proximate cause. Importantly, the Court noted that all jurors may still participate in deliberations on each element, even if they cannot actually vote on subsequent elements due to their earlier votes.
This ruling is of significance as it sets the stage for a scenario whereby a verdict for a plaintiff may require greater than a three fourth’s majority of remaining jurors eligible to vote. For example, in an instance such as that in Hild where only six of eight jurors find negligence, each of those six would need to go on to find probable cause, thus requiring unanimity among the eligible voting jurors. While those two jurors arguably most favorable to the defense (those who did not vote in favor of negligence) cannot not vote on the question of proximate cause, they remain able to participate in deliberations and make their views heard, potentially influencing the voting members.
Litigants and their counsel should be mindful of this ruling and craft their proposed jury interrogatories accordingly.
Questions? Contact Tom Cabral.

