Continuing Course of Conduct Does Not Extend Ohio’s Four-Year Statute of Repose for Legal Malpractice Actions

The Fifth District Court of Appeals has made it crystal clear: Ohio’s four-year statute of repose for legal malpractice claims is firm, and there’s no extending the clock. In the Appellate Court’s recent decision, it held that even on-going attorney conduct does not extend the four-year repose period. Rather, the clock starts ticking with the first act of alleged malpractice—period.

What is the statute of repose?

Ohio’s legal malpractice statute of repose, R.C. 2305.117(B), bars legal malpractice claims when the acts giving rise to the claim occurred more than four years earlier. Unlike a statute of limitations, a statute of repose does not turn on when an injury or cause of action is discovered (i.e., cognizable event). The statute of repose concerns only when an action is commenced in relation to when the underlying act or occurrence happened. Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found, 2016-Ohio-7432, ¶ 16, 29.

The Dervin Decision

The plaintiffs in Dervin & Assocs., Inc., v. Amer Cunningham Co., L.P.A., 2025-Ohio-4761 (5th Dist.), argued that an attorney’s continuing course of conduct extended the four-year statute of repose period. The Fifth District Court of Appeals rejected this contention, confirming that the clock began to run when the plaintiffs sustained an alleged injury, even though they may have continued to accrue monetary damages.

Dervin involved a dissolution dispute between former business partners, Cox and Albert. Cox properly and with authority retained attorney Morrison personally and on behalf of the company in the dispute. In June 2020, Albert sought to disqualify Morrison, arguing that a conflict of interest prohibited the representation. The motion to disqualify was denied. The litigation settled in January 2023, and Cox became the company’s sole member. Cox thereafter sued Morrison and his law firm for legal malpractice, seeking a return of the fees the company (through Albert) voluntarily paid to its lawyers.

Morrison argued on summary judgment that the company’s legal malpractice claim was time barred under Ohio’s four-year statute of repose because the purported conflicted representation arose as early as June 6, 2019 when Morrison filed a pleading seeking to dismiss Albert’s complaint in which he identified himself as the company’s legal counsel. The Stark County Court of Common Pleas denied Morrison’s motion, finding that, with respect to the statute of repose, the conflicted representation was “not a single act or omission but was a continuing course of conduct ongoing for a period of years.” Thus, it determined that there was an issue of fact concerning the date(s) of occurrences that gave rise to the legal malpractice claims.

On October 15, 2025, the Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the act that started the four-year clock running on the statute of repose occurred on June 6, 2019, when Morrison first entered an appearance and inflicted injury on the company by virtue of the claimed conflict of interest. Acknowledging that the company may have continued to incur monetary damages, the Court of Appeals held that no new harm or injury was sustained by the ongoing representation.

This decision provides clarity to Ohio’s legal professionals, confirming that the four-year statute of repose for legal malpractice claims is to be interpreted exactly as written. By concluding that the tolling period begins with the first act of alleged malpractice—without regard to ongoing conduct or accruing damages—the Dervin decision leaves no ambiguity. For legal practitioners, this means the statute of repose cannot be extended, reinforcing certainty and finality in the realm of professional liability.